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PREFACE
This report is designed to provide Committee members
and the public with a comprehensive background on the issue
of prospective (automatic) conformity of California income
tax laws with the federal Internal Revenue Code.
A discussion of the specific issues of conformity of
California law with the recent federal changes made in the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 will be the subject of
subsequent reports.
The issue of automatic conformity has been before the
Legislature for a number of years. Almost every session of
the Legislature has been presented with such a proposal.
In
1966 and 1968, the measures were submitted to the electorate
and rejected.
There have been a number of studies and reports on the
subject (see Appendix II).
In 1980, the Assembly Committee
on Revenue and Taxation held an interim hearing on SCA 31
(Mills) and the background briefing book for that hearing,
entitled "Federal Income Tax Conformity", is still available
through the Assembly Publications Office.
When SCA 14 by Senator Mills was before the Committee
again in 1981, the Committee felt the need for another interim
hearing on the subject, as a majority of the membership of the
Committee has changed since 1980.

i

One of the problems encountered in preparing this briefing book was the development of data on the shifts in tax
burden and revenue effects of conformity.
Due to the mass
changes
federal tax law enacted in August of 1981, data used
in the Committee's 1980 study are obsolete. Data illustrating
the tax shifts by income class which would result from conformity with the new federal law are not yet available. We are
hopeful that the staff of the Franchise Tax Board will have
some of this information ready for presentation to the
Committee on October 29, 1981.
This briefing book was prepared by David R. Doerr of the
Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee staff.
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ISSUES

•

California law is currently in substantial conformance
with federal income tax law although there are major areas
of difference. As each federal law change is made, the
Legislature revises state law only as it deems appropriate.
Some state laws are enacted to suit particular state needs
and have no federal counterpart .
1.

Is an amendment to the Constitution needed to permit the state to conform prospectively to federal
tax law?

2.

Should the Legislature be given the authority to
conform prospectively to federal tax law?

3.

Is prospective conformity to federal tax law
desirable or undesirable?

•
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Under this approach, the Legislature attempts to achieve
the highest degree of conformity practical and desirable,
but exercises its authority to adopt federal changes
which are deemed desirable for it and reject those which
are deemed undesirable for various reasons.
In addition,
the Legislature is free to adopt special tax provisions
which have no federal counterpart, when necessary, to meet
the needs and best interests of California.
Automatic Conformity
There are three basic approaches to automatic conformity.
a.

Adopt Federal Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). By adopting AGI, the state would be left with its own itemized
or standard deductions, tax credits and tax rates.

b.

Adopt Federal Taxable Income (TI). The taxable income
approach goes one step further, by conforming to the
federal zero bracket amount and itemized deductions.
In its "pure" form, AGI or TI conformity would be
total, but either approach leaves open the possibility
for various adjustments to be made by the state. Of
course, the more adjustments, the greater the complexity reintroduced.

c.

Piggyback Approach.
This is the highest degree of
simplicity, as the state tax becomes a percentage
(flat rate or graduated schedule) of federal tax
liability. This approach is what most lay persons
have in mind when they refer to "federal tax conformity".

The Chart on the following page illustrates, for the California tax, the relationship among AGI, TI, and tax
liability.
Constitutional Question
A procedural question that has lingered since 1959 is
whether automatic conformity must be achieved via constitutional amendment, or may be enacted by statute alone.
The question is yet to be resolved.
On October 19, 1959, the Office of Legislative Counsel
issued an opinion to the effect that automatic conformity
of the California law to future federal law would be an
unconstitutional delegation of the state's legislative
power to Congress. An updated opinion submitted September
30, 1980 came to the same conclusion: prospective conformity requires a constitutional amendment.
(See Appendices III and IV,respectively.)
A countervailing opinion is held by Prof. Gary T. Schwartz
of the UCLA Law School, who argues in a recent paper
(Appendix v ) that there is a "very good reason to believe
that an open-ended conformity statute would be held constitional by the California Supreme Court", based on a
3

S
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review of case law, much of it since the 1959 Counsel's
opinion. He states that whatever doubt still exists,
however, would be cured by an appropriate amendment to
the state constitution.
Schwartz and Counsel do agree
that conformity to federal law at a given point in time
can be enacted statutorily.
All of the measures considered by this Committee in the
1979-80 session were, or were linked to, constitutional
amendments.
Prior Publ

Votes in California

California voters have twice had the opportunity to
approve automatic conformity by constitutional amendment, in 1966 and again in 1968. However, these proposals
were rejected both times, and by a larger margin on the
second occasion.
Proposition 14 of 1966 failed by a vote
of 2,536,770 to 2,709,071 (48.4%- 51.6%) and Proposition 4
of 1968 went down by a margin of 2,881,249 - 3,190,542
(47.4%- 52.6%). (Refer to Appendix VI.)
Practice in Other States
California is one of 8 of the 40 broad-based income tax
states (as of October 1978) which does not refer by
statute to the Internal Revenue Code as a starting point
for computing its personal income tax return.
Of the remaining 32 states, 22 use federal AGI as a
starting point, six others use federal taxable income
as a starting point, and four use a percentage of the
federal tax as a starting point. However, each of these
states make adjustments from this starting point and some
adjustments are substantial. This tends to offset the
simplicity of using a federal starting point.
Further, during the past several years about one-third
of the 32 states have "frozen" the federal law as of a
specific date for their purposes, requiring legislative
action for the adoption of new federal changes. The
''freezing" approach is not unlike California's "selective conformity" approach, in that new federal changes
are made subject to legislative review to determine the
impact on tax policy, tax shifts and state revenues.
Rationale for Automatic Conformity
The main organized push for automatic conformity has
been from the legal and accounting professions, which
express dissatisfaction with the end product of the
current "selective/piecemeal" conformity approach. Their
dissatisfaction may be summarized as follows:
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This shift results from substituting
the $1,000 federal personal exemption for the state's
tax credit ($11 in 1981).

State Budget
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r federal law but not at the state level.

Revenue Instability
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conformity to federal income tax
, major
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changes will have a major impact on state income
tax revenues and the state budget.
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as $2.3 billion in the first year after the
federal act takes effect.
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has adjourned for the year. Two of the last
three
or tax revisions--the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and
the Revenue Act of 1978--were enacted on October 4 and
October 14, respectively. Both dates fall beyond the close
of the state legislative session. The most recent change,
the Federal Economic Tax Recovery Act was adopted on
August 13, 1981, after the 1981-82 state budget was adopted.
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APPENDIX I

AMENDED IN
AMENDED IN

23,

Senate Constitutional Amendment

14

Introduced by Senators Mills,
Assemblyman
February 18, 1981

Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 14-A resolution to
propose to the people of the State of California an
amendment to the Constitution of the state, by adding
Section 26.6 to Article XIII thereof, relating to taxation.

(

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SCA 14, as amended, Mills. Income tax.
Existing provisions of the California Constitution provide
that the Legislature may impose income taxes.
This measure would authorize the Legislature to simplify
the reporting and collecting of state personal
taxes by
incorporating federal law into state law.
Vote: %. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
Sta~e-mandated local program: no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Resolved by the Senate~ the Assembly concurring, That
the Legislature of
of California at its 1981-82
Regular Session
on
first day of
December, 1980, two-thirds
the members elected to
each of the two houses of the Legislature voting therefor,
hereby proposes to the people of
of California
that the Constitution of the
adding
Section 26.6 to Article XIII, to read:
~

SEC 26.6. Notwithstanding any
contained in this Constitution, the

12

SCA 14
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

-2-

simplify the reporting and collecting of California
personal income taxes by incorporating into state law by
reference to any provision of the laws of the United States
as such laws are or become effective at any time, or as
such laws are amended from time to time. The
Legislature may prescribe modifications or exceptions
from such laws.

0
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APPENDIX II

PUBLISHED STA'l'E STUDIES Cl':
FEDERAL CONFORMITY---Year
Report of Senate Fact
Finding Committee on
Revenue and Taxation:
Conformity of California
Personal Income and Bank
Corporation Franchise
Taxes with the Federal
Internal Revenue Code

Adopt p~ljcy that conformity
be achieved wherever

1961-63

Final Report of the
Assembly Interim Committee on Revenue and
Taxation

Continue policy of attempting
to achieve highest degree
of conformity between federal
and state laws as may be
pract~cal and desirable.
(pg. 56)

1964

Dr. Corrine Lathrop
Gilb's Report for the
Assembly Interim
Committee on Revenue
and Taxation: Conformity
of State Personal Income
Tax Laws to Federal
Personal Income Tax
Laws

Adopt method which provides
the maximum conformity for
the convenience of the taxpayer consistent with needs
for predictability and
control over revenue by the
state; (Vol. 4, No. 10,
Part 3, pg. 8)

1968-69

California Advisory
Commission on Tax Reform (Flournoy Commission)

No specific recommendation
but opposed blind conformity
as optimum objective.
(Vol. I, pg. 6)

1969

Staff Report to Senate
Committee on Revenue and
Taxation on Bills and
Constitutional Amendments Referred in 1968
to the Committee for
Study

Continue policy recommended
in 1961 report.

1969

Preliminary Report of
the Legislative-Executive Tax Study Group

Full conformity contains
•grave flaws• (pgs. 102-104)

1975

Franchise Tax Board
staff report: Should
California Abandon its
Current Select~ve Conformity Poli~ for
Automatic Co~ormity?

Continue policy of selective
conformity while seeking
simplification of state law
and promoting greater tax
equity (pg. 11)

1979

Final Report of the
Commission on Governmental Reform (Post
Commission)

Opposed full •piggybacking•
but recommended •use of a
modi!ied form of piggybacking .•• ~y specific adjustments to the •adjusted
gross income,. reported to
the U.S." (?g. 60)

1961

•

Re colwnendc1 t ion
----------

15

pract~cable

(Pg.

Rnd desir&ble.

:t:33)

APPENDIX III

•

Legislative Counsel Opinion
on
Constitutionality of Automatic Conformity
October 19, 1959
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Constitutional Problems Involved in
Conforming California's Personal
or.1e and Bank and Corporation 'l'ax
t·1i th Federal Inc orne 'fax Law
#504
The question has been asked: that constitutional
prcblems. if any, would confront the Le~islature in recr1ting California's ~ersonal Income Tax La~ (n. & T.C.
Sec. 17001 and following) and Bank and Corporation Tax La\1
(R .. & T .. c. Sec. 23001 and fcllm: ing) to 1t1a!~e these lat!S
conferral uith the Federal inccr.:e tax la~; ( Interne1l Revenue
Code of 1954, Subtitle A, co~mencing at Sec. 1)!

1.

Delegation of Legislative Power

A revision of the California la~s as indicated
would present the 9roblem of an unconstitutional del~3a
tion of the State•s lecislative power to the Congres~ of
the United States should it provide for the automatic inclusion
proa~ective congressional legislation.
The State Legislature is vested uith a generally
nondeleBable pet:er to r!:ake lavJB for the State of Califo~nia
(see 11 Cal. Jur. 2d 481; and Calif. Const., Art. III).
The California courts have Looked upon this as ~rohibiting
the Legislature fro1:1 providing for the automatic incor;>oration by reference of the future ar.;endli:ents of the lat·:s of
any other jurisdiction. As the court stated in Erock v.
Super
Court (1937), 9 Cal. 2d 291, 297:
" ••• It is, of course, perfectly valid to
ad t existing statutes, rules or regulations
of Congress or another state, by reference;
but
atte,.lpt to rt~ake future regulations of
sdiction part of tl1e state lc\1.' is
held to be an unconstitutional delegislative pouer.
1
'
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carrying back of such a loss to each of the three tJxable
ye8rs preceding the year in which it occurs, and carrying
1 t for~-:ard to each of the five years follmling. Insofar as
this provision might apply so as to cause a reduction in any
California taxes that may have~previously vested in the
State, there could be a violation of Section 31 of Article IV
of the State Constitution, which prohibits the Legislature
from making gifts of public money for private purpose3
(see Estate of Stanford v. Widber (1899), 126 Cal. 112;
and Allen v.~ranchise ~ aoara-(1952), 39 Cal. 2d 109).
Ralph N. Kleps
Legislative Counsel

JGjcc
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CHRISTOPHER ZIRKLE
DEPUTIES

Dear Mr. Deddeh:
QUESTION
Does the Legislature have power, by statute, to
incorporate federal law by reference into California's
Personal Income Tax Law?
OPINION
The Legislature has power, by statute, to incorporate existing federal law by reference into California's
Personal Income Tax Law. However, the Legislature may not
incorporate future federal laws into California's income
tax structure.
ANALYSIS
This question raises the possibility of an improper
delegation of legislative power.
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The cases hold that the Legislature is vested with
a generally nondelegable power to make laws for the State of
California (see, for example, 13 Cal. Jur. 3d, Const. Law,
Sec. 104, p. 198, et seq.; and Sec. 3, Art. III, Sec. 1,
Art. IV, Cal. Const.), and the courts have held that the
Legislature is generally prohibited from providing for the
automatic incorporation by reference of the future amendments of the laws of any other jurisdiction. As the court
stated, in Brock v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 291, 297:
" • • • It is, of course, perfectly
valid to adopt existing statutes, rules or
regulations of Congress or another state, by
reference; but the attempt to make future
regulations of another jurisdiction part of
the state law is generally held to be an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power."
(Emphasis added.)
In the cases, it was frequently stressed that the
delegation of legislative power to others would be upheld if
the discretion of the administrative officers charged with
administering the laws were controlled and guided by adequate
rules or standards prescribed therefor (see, for example,
Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal. 593, 600). However, more recent
cases indicate that the need is usually not for "standards"
but for "safeguards" to protect those affected by administrative action (Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 381, 382).
Moreover, whether the incorporation of future
federal laws-into this state's Personal Income Tax Law would
involve an invalid delegation of legislative power must be
determined under the terms of California's Constitution (see
Sandstrom v. Cal. Horse Racing Board, 31 Cal. 2d 401, 412),
and Californiars-constitution has been under a gradual
process of revision since 1966 (see Prop. 1-a, Ballot
Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Tuesday, Nov. 8, 1966).
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of the task of recommending to the Legislature
the
changes in the Constitution was delegated
to
· Revision Commission, which was created
pursuant to an Assembly concurrent resolution in 1963 (Res.
Ch. 1 , Stats. 1963). In its report to the Joint Committee
on Legislative Organization on February 15 1966, on the
proposed revision of seven articles of
fornia
Constitution, the commission stated as fol
page 24,
with respect to the delegation of legis
the proposed new constitutional provisions
" . • • The word 'provide• used.in
sense 'The Legislature may provide' ••.
a power which may be delegated. On
other hand the word 'prescribe,' used in
sense that something 'shall be prescribed'
indicates a power which may not be
II

that the courts would give considerable
meaning accorded to 11 provide" and "prescribe"
Constitution Revision Commission in construing the
new provisions of California's Constitution (see Van Arsdale
v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 249; Isaacson v. City of
Oakland, 263 Cal. App. 2d 414, 421). The constitutions of
none of those states which presently incorporate current
and future federal income tax law by reference require the
Legis
of the respective states to "prescribe" income
tax
Constitution Revision Commission was terminated,
March 4, 1974 lJoint Rules Committee Resolution
No .. 57, 1973-74 Reg. Sess.l, and a new group was formed to
study the revision of Article XIII of the State Constitution,
the
which deals primarily with tax matters. This
the "Constitutional Revision Task Force on
XIII," did not have the same status as the
Revision Commission,
that the task force
was not created pursuant to resolution or other official
legis
action. However, the report of the task force
was printed as an Appendix to the Senate Daily
for
May 14, 1974, and in the Assembly Journal
, 1974,
at page 13237, to express n
the
drafters of this revision and of the Legis
adopting
it" (at
13238 of the Assembly Journal).
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On page 13272
Assembly Journal, the task
force proposed the following language with respect to
income taxes in subdivision
a new Section 26 of
Article XIII of the State Constitution:
(a) Taxes on or measured by income
may be imposed on
, corporations
or other entities as prescribed by law."*
(Emphasis added.)
11

On the same
Assembly Journal, the task
force provided the following comment:
Sections 26 (a) and 26 (b) are intended
to consolidate existing Section 11 (which
authorizes the Legislature to impose income
taxes} with the pertinent portion of existing
Section 1 3/4 which
interest from
State and
bonds
income taxes."
11

Thus, unlike
Constitution Revision Commission,
the task force did not speak of the distinctions to be drawn
between "provide" and 11 prescribe." Instead, the task force
merely stated that i.t was intended to "consolidate"--but
not necessarily change--an existing constitutional provision.
The language in subdivision (a) of Section 26, as
Set forth abOVe 1. WaS Subsequently apprOVed by the VOterS
without change as a part of Proposition 8 on the ballot for
the General Election held on November 5, 1974. However, the
precise meaning of the former constitutional provision on
income taxes still remains somewhat obscure.
From the
in 1879 until its
XIII provided as follows

the adoption of the Constitution
74, former Section 11 of Article

"SEC. 11.. Income taxes
be assessed
to and collected from
, corporations,
joint-stock associations, or companies resident or doing business in this State, or any
one or more of them,
cases and amounts,
and in such manner, as shall be prescribed by
law."
(With emphasis
being added.)

*

The same material
Senate Daily
as a

in the Appendix to the
, 1974, which was printed
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prov1s1on was not interpreted by the
whether the Legislature could delegate
the
to impose an income tax. However, we do note that
constitutional amendments were bvice placed
the ballot
to
that purpose and were defeated
time
(Prop. 14, Ballot Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Nov. 8
66 Prop.
4,
Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Nov. 5, 1968).
With respect to the provision regarding income
the convention which convened in Sacramento
8, 1878, some of the delegates seemed aware of
rule that the Legislature would have inherent
an income tax, even without a constitutional
therefor, while others were not so sure that
authorization would be unnecessary (see
~.~.- Proceedinis of the Constitutional Convention of
State of Californ1a, Vol. II, at pp. 946, 947; see also
.-r:owery, 25 Cal. 2d 561, 568; and Roth Drug, Inc.
13 Cal. App. 2d 720, 739, 740, for a discussion
lature's inherent power to tax).
The convention did not reach the issue of whether
a di
was intended between "provide" and "prescribe,"
as used in the income tax provision.
However, cases construing other constitutional
decided prior to the time the Constitutional
Convention met in 1878 held that "prescribed" indicated a
nonde
legislative power (_see Exline v. Smith, 5 Cal.
112, 113; see also People v. Provines, 34 Cal. 520, 526),
and
generally be presumed that the framers of the
Constitution intended to use "prescribed" in this restricted
v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345, 360).
that the courts will look to other sections
in which a word is used in order to
meaning in the section at issue (_Miller v.
Dunn,
• 462, 466}.
provis~ns

Moreover, after the Constitution of
79 was
prior to the commencement of the constitutional
1966, the courts continued to
a distinction
between "provide" and "prescribe" in constitutional provis
People v. Johnson, 95 Cal. 471, 474,
5; Slavich
82 Cal. App. 2d 228, 232-235).
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California's Personal Income Tax Law. However, since the
Legislature must "prescribe" this state's income tax laws,
the Legislature could not incorporate future changes in
federal statutes. Morever, we think it would be necessary
to amend the Constitution to implement a program to incorporate future federal laws into the Personal Income Tax Law.
Very truly yours,

•

Bion M. Gregory
Legislative Counsel

~~
By

.4>L 4v ,W ~-

Christopher J. Wei
Deputy Legislative Counsel

CJW:jm
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Report on
Income Tax Conformity and "Piggybacking"
Under the California Constitution,
by
Prof. Gary T. Schwartz, UCLA Law School,
April 9, 1980
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INTRODUCTION

•

In this Report I consider two related questions:

Whether

it would be constitutional for California to adopt a statute
conforming its income tax's base to the federal tax base in an
"open-ended" or "ongoing" way; * and whether it would be constitutional for Congress to accept the invitation tendered by
Congress in the Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972, as
I

amended.

One of my conclusions will be that there is a high

probability that the California Supreme Court would affirm the
constitutionality of an open-ended conformity statute.

However,

as for participation in the federal program, I will conclude that
strong arguments can be advanced both in favor of and in opposition
to constitutionality, and that there is no obvious method for
reliably predicting which set of arguments the California Supreme
Court would find the more persuasive.
Most of this Report consists of a long exposition of the
relevant case law.

This exposition aspires to be as straight-

forward and "neutral" as possible, so that the reader can make
up his own mind as to what the proper legal inferences are.

To

this extent, much of the Report is quite deliberately "dull."
Part II consists of my own effort to utilize the law exposited
in Part I in order to analyze the California constitutional
questions.
The Report also makes clear that whatever constitutional

*There is no doubt whatsoever that a California "date of
enactment" conformity statute would be valid. See pp. 33-38,
infra. California's constitution does not contain any New York-like
prohibition against incorporation by reference. See p. 12, infra.
36
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conformity or "piggybacking"

doubts there may

•

could be cured by an
tion.

amendment to the state constitu-

While

California in

have been defeated in
been reasonably close;

pas

and Colorado, have

and a number of states,

constitutions so as to

been successful
authorize open-ended
A final p
judgments which

reference to certain policy
Legislature could plausibly render.

It should be make

to which I myse
legislator, I do not

et that these are judgments
necessarily subscribe.

Were I a

I would vote on the conformity issue.
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STANDARDS AND THE

A.
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agency which has been
s engages in
that delegation

a

•

Constitution, vesting

cons
federal

e

s i

When a state
correlate question

concerns

s

f

legation under the state

cons
trines are
relative

ss can delegate

c

if,

meaningful standards
agency decisionmaking.

or an
See

9 (1928).

however,

In fact,

Supreme Court has found

p

even though the standards

set

ous.

Thus such s
Uni

le," Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v, ·
convenience, interest,

or necess
Co., 289 U.S.

Federal
suffi

methods of competition,"
1 (1920), have been held
standard.

Given this

can fairly enough argue

that Congressional delegations to federal agencies are valid
even in the absence of a clearly "intelligible" standard., See
K. Davis, 1 Administrativ.e Law Treatise 177 (2d ed. 1978).
Indeed, in all of American constitutional history, there are
only two Supreme Court cases, both of them decided

i~

the judicially

aggressive year of 1935, which have found particular delegations to
federal agencies to be beyond Congress's power.

Panama Refining Co.

v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), invalidated provisions
of a New Deal measure authorizing the President to prohibit the
shipment of "hot oil" in interstate cormnerce.

In fact, the legis-

lation in question did contain standards for Presidential decisionmaking

the "intelligibility" of which seems

clearly sufficient

in light of both earlier and later Supreme Court decisions.

For

this reason, the Panama holding is presently understood either as
no longer stating good law or as being severely limited to its
particular facts.

See K. Davis, supra, at 175.

Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935),
invalidated key provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act
which had delegated to a new federal agency the authority to establish
comprehensive codes of conduct governing all businesses subject
to Congress's commerce clause powers.

Especially since the

Schecter Court was unanimous, the Court's holding must be taken
somewhat seriously.

In truth, the standards set forth in the Act

(like the standards in Panama) seem to pass constitutional muster.
What was distinctive about the Schecter delegation--and what thus distinguishes the Schecter case from other delegation cases--is the
extensiveness or "scopett of the legislature's delegation.
K. Davis, supra, at 176.

See

The federal agency was being given
39
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sw~eping

powers to regulate wide-ranging aspects of the

interstate economy.

At least in this sense the statute did indeed

involve "delegation running riot," 295 U.S. at 553 (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).

Insofar as Schecter has not been overruled, it

implicitly stands for the federal principle that the "scope" of
the delegation is a variable to be taken into account in ruling on
the delegation's constitutionality.
\~at

about state constitutional doctrines on delegation?

One scholar has observed that the anti-delegation rule possesses
far more vitality within state constitutional law than it does at
the federal level.

SeeK. Davis, supra, at 204.

does not really apply to California, however.

This observation

Prior to 1939,

California courts frequently enough intervened to invalidate
state legislature '·s delegations to state administrative agencies.
See, e.g., People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624 (1881).

But leading

California Supreme Court opinions in 1939 and 1940 not only
liberalized California delegation law, but set the stage for
and more drastic liberalizations.
Brock, 13 Cal. 2d

Jersey Maid Uilk Products Co. v.

620, 91 P.2d 577

(1939), affirmed a state

statute conferring on the state Director of Agriculture the
to designate marketing areas for the milk industry and to es
"stabilization and marketing plans"

in local areas.

And

Parker affirmed, against delegation challenge, additional aspects
of state's anti-Depression agricultural legislation. 15 Cal. 2d
275, 101 P.2d 665 (1940).

So far as I know, in the years since

Jersey Maid and Ray·not a single California statute delegating powers
to an administrative agency has been held unconstitutional on
40
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an insufficiency in the standards guiding the delegation.

(But see

•

Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd. , 11 Cal.
d 801, 523 P.2d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1974).) Illustrative of
cases finding particular delegations permissible are Sunset
Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 7 Cal. 3d 64, 496 P.2d
840, 101 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1972); City and County of San Francisco
v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 236, 347 P.2d 294, 1 Cal. Rptr. 158
59); and Stoddard v. Edelman, 4 Cal. App. 3d
443, hearing· denied (1970).

544, 84 Cal. Rptr.

As for the meaninglessness of the

ostensible requirement that the Legislature set forth standards
that provide meaningful guidance, consider Holloway v. Purcell,
35 Cal. 2d 220, 217 P.2d 665 (1950), in which the Court rejected
a challenge to a state statute delegating to the Highway Commission
authority to determine the location of highways running between
termini designated by the Legislature.

The only standard which

the statute evidently set forth as to highway location was that
Commission make use of "such terms ancl conditions as in [the
Commission's] opinion will best subserve the public interest."
cannot imagine a "standard" more vacuous than "public interest".
Surely an agency would never be given legislative instructions
to ignore or subvert the public interest; and obviously
the "public interest" goal is wholly nonoperational in the "guidance"
it 5s capable of giving.

Yet the Supreme Court, in a bland opinion

auLhored by Justice Traynor, indicated that "public interest"
provided a "sufficiently definite primary standard" which an administrative agency could be asked by the Legislature to "specifically
apply."

(For a comparable U.S. Supreme Court holding, see Avent v.

United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924).)

41
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The effective bankruptcy of the "sufficient standard" aspect
of California's

trad~tional

rule on the legality of delegations

has been explicitly recognized in the California Supreme Court in
its recent, path-breaking opinion in Kugler v. Yocum, which is
discussed below.

42
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B.

DELEGATION BY CONGRESS OF FEDERAL LAWMAKING AUTHORITY TO THE
STATES:

THE RELEVANCE OF CONFORMITY AS A JUSTIFYING PRINCIPLE

In one dramatic situation, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded
the federal interest in conformity between federal and state
law can constitutionally justify a substantial delegation of
federal lawmaking authority to the states.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 13,

any act committed on a federal territory which would violate a
statute of the state in which the territory lies is ipso
facto a criminal offense against the United States.

Section 13

(which was enacted in 1948) thus "assimilates" even criminal
statutes of a state which may be enacted by the state subsequent
to 1948.

In United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.;S. 286 (1958), a

defendant was prosecuted in 1955 for certain sexual conduct on a
federal air force base in Texas which was contrary to a Texas
penal statute that had been enacted in 1950.

The issue the United

States Supreme Court addressed was whether § 13 "is constitutional
insofar as it makes applicable to a federal enclave a subsequently
enacted criminal law of the state in which the enclave is situated.'
Id. at 286.
tionality.

By a

7~2

vote, the Court ruled in favor of constitu-

The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Douglas

and concurred in by Justice Black, highlights the difficulty of
the delegation issue.

The Douglas dissent begins by recognizing

Congress's Article I authority to regulate federal enclaves.
Douglas then reasoned that this authority
call[s] for the exercise of legislative judgment;
and I do not see how that requirement can be
satisfied by delegating the authority to the
President, the Department of the Interior, or, as
in this case, to the states. . . . Congress can
43
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7

adopt as federal laws the [existing] laws of a
state . . . Congress can, I think, adopt as
federal law, governing an enclave, the state law
governing speeding as it may from time to time
be enacted. The Congress there determines what
the basic policy is. Leaving the details to be
filled in by a state is analogous to the scheme
of delegated implementation of congressionally
adopted policies with which v7e are familiar in
the field of administrative law. But it is
Congress that must determine the policy for that
is the essence of lawmaking. Under the scheme
now approved a State makes such federal law,
applicable to the enclave, as it likes, and that
law becomes federal law, for the violation of
which a citizen is sent to prison. . . . Here
it is a sex crime on which Congress has never
legislated. Tomorrow it may be a blue law, a
law governing usury, or even a law requiring
segregation of the races on buses and in
restaurants. .
[An accused] is entitled to
the considered judgment of Congress whether the
law applied to him fits the federal policy. That
is what federal lawmaking is. . . . There is some
convenience in doing what the Court allows today . . .
But convenience is not material to the constitutional
problem.
Id. at 297-99.
The opinion for the Court majority began by describing the
legislative precursors of § 13.

Earlier federal statutes had

adopted as federal law for enclave purposes only those state
statutes in effect at the time of the particular federal enactment.
But since Congress was conn:n.itted to the goal of achieving "conformity 1
between federal enclave law and state law, Congress was required
to reenact this "assimilation" statute in 1866, 1874, 1895, 1909,

1933, 1935, and 1944.

It was against the background of this

experience that Congress in its 1948 legislation attempted to
incorporate or assimilate even those state statutes enacted subsequent to 1948.
The Court's reasoning made clear the laudability of the
44
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policy of "conformity" which Congress had been pursuing.

It recog-

nizkd that "having the power to assimilate the state law, Congress
obviously has like power to renew such assimilation annually or
daily in order to keep the law in the enclaves current with those
in the states."

Id. at 293-94.

Noting Congress's "123 years

of experience with the policy of conformi·ty," the Court then
concluded that
Congress is within its constitutional powers and
legislative discretion when . . . it enacts that
[conformity] policy in its most complete and
accurate form. Rather than being a delegation
by Congress of its legislative authority to the
states, it is a deliberate continuing adoption by
Congress for federal enclaves of such unpre-empted
offenses and punishments as shall have already been
put in effect by the respective states for their
own government. Congress retains power to exclude
a particular state law from the assimilative effect
of the Act. This procedure is a practical accommodation of the mechanics of the legislative functions of
state and nation in the field of police power where
it is especially appropriate to make the federal
regulation of local conduct conform to that already
established by the state.
Id. at 294.

The Court then referred to several other

federal statutes which in one way or another gave federal effect
to whatever state criminal rules were in effect at the state level
at the time of the statute's enactment.
A number of post-Sharpnack lower federal court opinions
reveal the variety of ways in which the Sharpnack holding can
authorize a seeming delegation of federal lawmaking authority to
the states.

Wallach v. Lieberman, 366 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1966),

involved a personal injury which occurred in a federal post
office.

40 U.S.C. § 90 stipulates that a state's workers' compen-

sation law applies to injuries within a federal building situated
45
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within that state.

In Wallach the personal injury victim--who

wi.shed to sue his employer in tort rather than merely claiming
under workers' compensation--argued that the federal statute,
insofar as it incorporated the state's workers' compensation law,
entailed an unconstitutional delegation to the state.

The Second

Circuit, relying on Sharpnack and noting the propriety of Congress's
policy of seeking conformity between federal and state law on all
federal properties, rejected this challenge.
United States v. Smeldome, 485 F.2d 1333 (lOth Cir. 1973),
affirmed 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which provides a federal penalty for
anybody managing or owning "an illegal gambling business"; such a
business is in turn defined as a gambling business employing a
minimum number of people, in business for a minimum number of
days, and in "violation of the law of a state or political subdivision in which it is conducted . .

"

Smeldome involved a

sports betting operation taking place in Colorado in seeming
violation of a Colorado gambling statute.

The defendant argued

that § 1955 was unconstitutional insofar as it delegated federal
lawmaking authority to the states.

The Tenth Circuit, relying on

Sharpnack, rejected this challenge, ruling that "[i]t is well
settled in the law that Congress may adopt as federal laws the
laws of a state, and such is not an unconstitutional delegation
of congressional authority."

Id. at 1345.

In United States v.

Curcio, 310 F. Supp. 351 (D. Colo. 1970), a district court also
relied on a simple statement of the Sharpnack rule in affirming
the constitutionality of§ 892(B)(l)

of the Federal Consumer

Credit Protection Act, providing that if a particular extension
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of credit is unenforceable under state law, this is "prima
facie evidence" that the credit extension is "extortionate"
and therefore in violation of federal law.

Smeldome and Curcio

suggest that the lower courts are giving the Sharpnack rule a
rather broad interpretation, allowing it to be applied even when
there has not been a convincing showing as to the federal need
for or interest in conformity.

However, in neither Smeldome nor

Curcio did the relevant state statute in fact postdate the federal
statute; and only in postdating situations is the problem of an
open-ended delegation explicitly and dramatically presented.
I should make clear that federal rules of the Sharpnack sort
deal only with the proper interpretation of the provisions in
Article I of the U.S. Constitution, conferring lawmaking powers on
Congress; the Sharpnack rule thus does not directly "apply" to
California.

However, both the status of the U.S. Supreme Court

and the quality of its reasoning in Sharpnack suggest that the
Sharpnack rule would probably be treated by California courts as an
influential

oui-of~state

precedent.
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C.

NON-CALIFORNIA STATE LAW ON THE DELEGATION OF STATE LAWMAKING
AUTHORITY TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:

A "SOFT" PROHIBITING RULE

In reading judicial opinions, one can easily enough identify
a "general rule" to the effect that state legislatures may r:ot
delegate lawmaking authority to the federal government (call this
"the Rule").

(See Annot., 133 A.L.R. 401 (1941), annotating

Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495 (1940), a case which

e

does clearly apply the Rule to a state statute professing to
require labeling of local fruit according to federal standards.)
The more one reads these opinions, however, the less solid one
understands the Rule to be.

Many of the cases--including most

of the recent cases--deal with tax conformity statutes.

While

these cases will be treated separately in the next section, it
suffices here to say that several of them reach an affirmative
result on the constitutional question, and that the single opinion
squarely invalidating a tax conformity statute comes from a jurisdiction whose constitution contains special language.
In recent years, many of the references to the Rule have come in
sheer dicta.

See e.g., State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wash. 2d

259, 501 P.2d 290, 301 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973);
State ex rel. Kirschner v. Urquhart, 50 Wash. 2d 131, 310 P.2d 261,
265 (1957); Calvert v. Capital Southwest Corp, 441 S.W.2d 247, 264
(Tax Ct. Civ. App. 1969); State v. Dumler, 221 Kan. 386, 391, 559
P.2d 798, 803 (1977).

For a case that blends apparent dictum with

a very limited holding applying

th~

Rule, see State v. Williams,

119 Ariz. 595, 583 P.2d 251 (1978).
In the non-tax context, a number of the opinions announcing
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the Rule likewise turn out to contain peculiar features.

In 1935

the New York Court of Appeals, divided 4-3, held unconstitutional
a state statute which applied to the intrastate coal industry
whatever codes were developed for interstate coal by the federal
National Recovery Administration.
196 N.E.61 (1935).

Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y.290,

The majority chiefly relied, however, on a

particular provision in the New York state Constitution prohibiting
the incorporation by reference even of "any existing law"; the
purpose of this special provision, the majority indicated, is to
prevent the New York legislature from misunderstanding laws that
it otherwise might vote to pass. (For another New York holding
resting on this special constitutional prohibition, see People v.
Mazzie, 78 Misc. 2d 1014, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 307 (1974).) In Relegate
Bros. Co. v. Bayshore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 A.672 (1938), a unanimous
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a state statute incorporating
into Pennsylvania law whatever minimum hours might be fixed by
future federal NRA regulations for certain industries.

The Pennsyl-

vania Court was concerned not just with the Rule, however, but also
-

with the inequalities which the statute's delegation would produce
as among different classes of Pennsylvania employers.
In recent years, the largest number of cases dealing with the
Rule have concerned state statutes rendering it a state offense for
individuals to possess, without prescription, drugs that have been
given certain designations by the federal Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, exercising authority conferred on him/her by
Congressional statutes.

When these state laws were enacted, most

of the relevant federal statutes were already in place; the federal
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Secretary had made some designations, but others were to be made
by 'him in the future.

The Supreme Courts of Nebraska, North Dakota,

Georgia, and Michigan have all interpreted their states' statutes
as applying only to federal law and designations already in effect
when the state statutes were enacted.

State v. Workman, 186 Neb. 467,

183 N.W.2d 911 (1971); State v. Julson, 202 N.W.2d 145 (N.D. 1972);
People v. Urban, 45 Mich. App. 255, 206 N.W.2d 511 (1973); Johnston
v. State, 227 Ga. 387, 181 S.E.2d 42 (1971).

While all of these

interpretations were motivated by a desire to avoid a constitutional
ruling, only the Michigan opinion stated flat-out that the state
statute,

if not so interpreted, would be unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota and Washington, finding
their statutes indeed open-ended, ruled them unconstitutional.
These Courts were only partly concerned with the question of delegation, however.

Their opinions chiefly \vorry about the problem

of due process or "fair notice."
1

As the South Dakota Court

described the situation:
The list of hallucinogenic drugs was constantly
changing ~nd at any given time it would be
necessary to consult the regulations of the
Secretary to determine whether or not a certain
drug came within the prohibition of the state
statute.
State v. Johnson, 84 S.D. 556, 558, 173 N.W.2d 894, 895 (1970).
According to the Washington Court, "it is unreasonable to expect
an average person to continually research the Federal Register
to determine which drugs are controlled substances."

State v.

Dougall, 89 Wash. 2d 118, 570 Pac. 2d 135, 138 (1977).
Over the years, Michigan courts have been especially interested
50
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in the Rule.

In Lievense v. Michigan Unemployment Comp. Comm'n,

335 Mich. 339, 55 N.W.2d 857 (1952), the Court considered a state
statute imposing certain burdens on each employer who "is liable
for any federal tax" under the federal unemployment compensation
program.

The Court indicated that if the statute applied to

prospective federal rulings on employer liability, the Michigan Act
would be unconstitutional on account of the Rule.

It therefore

interpreted the "is liable" clause to refer only to liability
existing under federal law at the time the Michigan statute was
itself enacted.

In Dearborn Independent, Inc., v. City of Dearborn,

331 Mich. 447, 49 N.W.2d 370 (1951), the Court considered a state
statute requiring that all "official publications" of Michigan
cities be published only in newspapers "which shall have been
admitted by the United States Post Office Department for transmission as mail matter of the second class."

The Court, though

badly divided on another issue, unanimously ruled
unconstitutionally violated the Rule.
the Rule is less than absolute.

that the statute

However, even in Michigan

In People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305,

-

17 N.W.2d 193 (1945-). a divided Supreme Court upheld a Detroit
ordinance attaching a local penalty to any violation within Detroit
of wartime federal price control rules.

The Court relied both on

the emergency created by wartime inflation and on the fact that
the ordinance
did not create new regulations and prohibitions
but merely added the city's enforcement sanction
to Federal laws and regulations which were
already applicable to the city and its inhabitants
during the emergency.
310 Mich. at 319, 17 N.W.2d at 197.
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For a contrary holding
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above review of
non-California decis

case law can be easily summarized.
, delegations of lawmaking authority

states to the federal government do seem somewhat disfavored.
the case law is shaggy, full of qualifications, and lacking
underlying basic explanation.

It is very doubtful that the

Supreme Court--or indeed any California court--would
any significant weight to this unimpressive collection of

opin~

If anything, the cases strongly suggest that it is necessary to
ider a particular delegation in the context of the state statute
which it is found; that is, the purpose of the particular statute
well bear on the acceptability of the delegation.
, then it makes speci
with the proprie

If this is

sense to bring together those cases
of state tax statutes conforming the
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state's income tax base with federal income tax standards.
cases are described in the next section.
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laws of the United States."
amendment came into effect, the
ts powers by enacting a state
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be or become effective, at any
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322 (1967), the constitutionality
the Nebraska Supreme Court.
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titution of the state and since
's Constitution in this respect,
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violation.

But the Anderson taxpayer then asserted an ingenious

•

fallback position:

that the Nebraska statute's delegation

violated the "republican form of government" guarantee set forth
in the enabling legislation admitting Nebraska to the United
States,

While regarding this as a "case of first impression,"

the Court concluded that the state statute was not lacking in
republicanness, since the statute "does not constitute a waiver
of the sovereignty of the state nor an abdication of its functions."
The

Court~s

reasoning on this point weakens the force of its

delegation dictum.
2,

In the Absence of Specific Constitutional Amendment
Only one state court has actually invalidated a state

conformity statute on constitutional delegation grounds.

A

Minnesota statute provided that individual gross income for state
income tax purposes "means the adjusted gross income as computed
for federal tax purposes as defined in the laws of the United
States for the taxable year, with the modifications specified in
this Section."

A federal law promulgated subsequent to this statute's

amendment-permitted the exclusion from income of sick pay which an
employee might receive, an exclusion which would not have been
otherwise allowed by Minnesota law.

In invalidating the

Minnesota conformity statute, the Minnesota Court discussed
general delegation doctrine.

Federal adjusted gross income, it

argued, is
an artificial concept created solely by Federal
statute. . . . The amounts which are to be
included or excluded in the determination are
numerous and subject to change. Many of these
58
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reference thereto, the adoption takes the
statute as it exists at the time.
170 Ga. at 394,

3 S.E. at 70.

Having interpreted the statute

this way, the Court concluded that the del
without merit."

objec

The Court's opinion is not clear as to

the precise "merit" of the objection would
statute explicitly provided for continuing

been had the
ty.

Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (

69), dealt

the Illinois income tax conformity statute, passed in 1969.
The statute provided that Illinois net income "is computed for
individuals by taking the adjusted gross income from the federal
income tax return," with certain adjustments, deductions and
exemptions provided for in the state statute.

Also, § 102, the

"construction" section of the state statute, specified that
any term used in this Act shall have the same
meaning as when used in a comparable context
in the United States Income Tax Revenue Code of
1954 and other provisions of the statutes of the
United States relating to federal income taxes
as such Code and statutes are in effect on the
.date of enactment of this Act.
In considering the delegation challenge to the Illinois Act, the
Court focused on § 102; noting that § 102 limited itself to
federal law "in effect at the date of enactment" of the Illinois
Act, the Court found this section entirely cons
incorporation-by-reference.

tutional as an

But the Court also noted that "there

is some scholarly opinion, as well as case law from other
jurisdictions, that the legislature could adopt a statute providing
that future modifications of the Code would have consequences in
the meaning and application of the Act."
250 A.2d at 640.

43 Ill. 2d. at 49,

It is unclear whether the

t's "date of

32
enactment"

for § 102 carries over to the statute's
re

to federal adjusted gross income.

seems to assume that it does; but
t

re

re

latter provision's

taxpayer's ac

to

The

"federal income tax

an interpretation difficult.
advantages of interpreting statutes to
questions, the

interpretations in
seem

guided.

in the paragraph above.
the
seems

As for

In Santee Mills

third" provision of the state statute

tent with a ruling that would not allow the taxpayer

simply to consult his federal tax return for the particular year
making his one-third calculation.
in Mullaney.)

(Compare the Ninth Circuit's

For practical reasons of this sort, it

be that the "date of enactment" holding in Featherstone has
since

ignored in Georgia.

See Head v. McKenney, 61 Ga. App.

552, 556, 6 S.E.2d 405, 407 (1939), in which the Court, in
quoting from Featherstone, interestingly edits out its "date of
enactment" language, and then describes the Georgia tax assessment
process as follows:
The State Revenue Commission, in assessing the
tax against McKenney, merely adopted the Federal
method of calculating his net income under the
Federal statute as the State's method of
accomplishing that result, and properly assessed
the tax due to the State as one-third of the
amount which he had paid to the United States.
Such adoption was not a delegation to the Federal
authorities of the State's power to tax.
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E.

LAW ON THE DELEGATION OF STATE LAWMAKING AUTHORITY
GOVERNMENT:

A THIN BUT NOT UNINTERESTING RECORD

the issue of the legality of delegations from the state
1

to

s

federal government, negative language can be

two early California Supreme Court decisions.

In the

is a state Court of Appeal holding which
legation.

In the 1940's, the Supreme Court again used
a delegation; but a 1960's Supreme Court

gave emphatic application to a delegating statute without
licitly discussing the constitutional question.
an

tance tax statutory precedent.

s

1.

There is also

Of the two early Supreme Court opinions, the first is

In the Matter of Burke, 190 Cal. 326, 212 P. 193 (1923).

Subsequent

to Congress's enactment of the Volstead Act on prohibition, California
voters approved by referendum the Wright Act, which professed to incorporate

law all of the pertinent penal provisions of
tead Act.

In Burke, the California Supreme Court's chief

was that nothing in the California constitution prohibited
amounted to an incorporation-by-reference.
ass

The particular

was made that the Wright Act was invalid on grounds
ssed to include into California law any amendments to
which Congress might enact in the future.

The

to this assertion by saying:
It may be conceded that this provision [of the Wright
Act] is not valid, although we do not decide it, since
it is not involved. The only effect of putting that
provis
into the statute would be, at most, tpat the
provision itself would be void, leaving the remainder
of the Act valid. It is not such a component part
of the Act itself as would be necessary to require us to
that
invalidated the entire Act.
. at 3

P. at 194.
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and nation are attempting to rehabilitate the
interchange of produce. . . . The incidental
objection that the delegation of code prescription
to the President of the United States on the ground
that the state of California is a sovereign state
and the President is in this state a foreign official does not greatly impress us. The correlative
rights of state and nation are of great importance,
but we are a nation not an alliance of foreign
states, and our President is not a foreign potentate. . . . If ever there could occur a state of
facts justifying, even demanding, co-operative
effort between the state and the nation, as provided for in the law under consideration here, we
have it in the principle underlying this case. The
disease is but one and the patient is but one; how
logical that the curative agents must not conflict.
Only confusion could result if one code were fixed for
produce entering interstate commerce and another code
for produce entering intrastate commerce.
1 Cal. App. 2d. at 203-04, 36 P.2d at 687. Lasswell thus sets
forth a dramatic holding to the effect that state delegation to
federal authorities can be constitutionally justified by the
need for state-federal collaboration in dealing with a particular
societal problem.

In this regard, Lasswell is commended in Mermin,

"Cooperative Federalism" Again:

State and Municipal Legislation

Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future Federal Requirements: I,
57 Yale L.J. 1, 12-13 (1942).
The "authority" of the Lasswell holding should not be overstated, however. Lasswell is, of course, only a Court of Appeal
opinion.

Moreover, the Lasswell opinion is weakened by its failure

to allude to the Supreme Court's previous discussion of the delegation issue in Burke.

And other aspects of the Lasswell opinion

suggest that the LasswellCourt may have insufficiently appreciated
the integrity of the non-delegation doctrine.

In another of its

holdings, the Lasswell Court approved the statute's massive deledelegation of authority to an administrative agency.
74
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federal counterpart of this state delegation was held unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Schecter.
3.

The 1940's Supreme Court opinion is Palermo v. Stockton

Theatres, Inc., 32 Cal. 2d 53, 195 P.2d 1 (1948). California's
Alien Land Law of 1920 and 1923 prohibited

aliens not qualifying

for U.S. citizenship from owning or leasing land in California-unless the aliens' rights in these respects were protected by
treaty.

A 1911 treaty between this country and Japan entitling

Japanese to own or lease land in the United States worked to trigger
the Land Law's treaty proviso.

Particular Japanese nationals leased

land in California in 1935 for a 10-year period.

In 1940, the 1911

treaty was abrogated by the United States, and the owners of the
land sought to void the lease.

A Court of Appeal ruled that the

Alien Land Law referred to treaties only as they existed in 1920
and 1923; hence the repeal of the treaty in 1940 did not deprive
the Japanese nationals of their property rights.

In reaching this

holding, the Court indicated--citing Brock and Burke--that there
is "grave doubt whether our legislature could constitutionally
delegate to the

tr~aty-making

authority of the United States" the

power to determine California law "with respect to future acts."
The California Supreme Court, in affirming the Court of
Appeal's holding, adopted all of that Court's opinion, including
this delegation passage.

32 Cal. 2d at 60, 195 P.2d at 5.

But it is clear from the paragraphs which the Supreme Court added
(as a supplement) to the Court of Appeal opinion that the Supreme
Court had an even stronger reason for giving the Alien Land Law
a narrow interpretation.

Unless that Law was construed as compat-

ible with the particular lease, the Supreme Court would have been
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required to launch a full enquiry into the constitutionality of
the Alien Land Law itself, insofar as it discriminated against
aliens.

It was chiefly to avoid this constitutional dispute that

the Court subscribed to the "static" interpretation of the Land
Law recommended by the Court of Appeal.

(That Court's opinion,

it can be added, relied on the precedent of the federal Assimilative Crimes Act concerning federal enclaves, an Act which at the
time the opinion was released applied only to state criminal laws
in effect at the time the Act had been (re)enacted.

But as we

know, in 1948 Congress amended the Act to render its delegation
open-ended in character--and this amendment was later endorsed
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sharpnack.

Presently, therefore,

the federal precedent works to dispel the "doubt" to which the
Palermo language refers.)
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4.

The 1960's case is Eden Hemorial Park Ass'n v. Department

of Publi"c Works, 59 Cal. 2d 412, 380 P.2d 390, 29 Cal. Rptr. 790
(1963), in which the California Supreme Court willingly applied a
state statute which effectively delegated lawmaking powers to the
federal government; however, in

effectin~

this application, the

Court did not explicitly discuss the statute's constitutionality.
Federal grant-in-aid programs frequently raise problems as
to the relationship between the powers of state and local governments under state law and the requirements set forth by federal
law for participation in the federal programs.

Recognizing the

potential for problems of this sort in the federal-aid highway
program in the 1930's, the

Ca~ifornia

Legislature enacted a

statute which, as amended, now appears as § 820 of the State and
Highway Code.
State Assent to Federal Statutes, Rules and
Regulations.
The State of California assents to the provisions
of Title 23, United States Code, as amended
and supplemented [and] other Acts of Congress
relative to federal aid. . . . All work done
under the provisions of Title 23 or said other
Acts of Congress relative to highways shall be
performed as required under Acts of Congress
and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. Laws, rules, or regulations of this state
inconsistent with such laws, or rules and regulations of the United States, shall not apply to
such work, to the extent of such inconsistency.
For delegation purposes, § 820 is a very strong statute.
It "assents" in advance to the invalidation of any state laws or
77
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policies which may come into conflict with a federal highway
•
program regulation, whenever that regulation is itself promulgated.
As it happens, I am
infrequent.

advi~ed

that conflicts of this sort have been

But in the interesting Eden Park case, § 820 turned

out to be decisive.

Under the California Health and Safety Code

(§ 8560, 8560.5), state and local agencies are forbidden from

exercising eminent domain powers against cemetery property for

•

purposes of constructing any street or highway.

Yet in 1960,

both federal and state highway officials determined that a
cemetery area near Los Angeles was the best location for a freeway
which was to be part of the federal Interstate System.

Section 107

of Title 23 of the United States Code reads as follows:
(a) In any case in which the Secretary is
requested by a State to acquire lands or
interests in lands . . . required by such
State for right-of-way or other purposes in
connection with the prosecution of any project
for the construction . . . of any section of
the Interstate System, the Secretary is
authorized, in the name of the United
States . . . to acquire, enter into, and take
possession of such lands or interests in lands
by purchase, donation, condemnation, or otherwise-in accordance with the laws of the United
States . . . if
(1) the Secretary has determined either that
the State is unable to acquire necessary lands
or interest in lands, or is unable to acquire
such lands or interest in lands with sufficient
promptness; and
(2) the State has agreed with the Secretary to
pay, at such time as may be specified by the
Secretary an amount equal to ten percent of
the costs incurred by the Secretary, in acquiring
such lands . . .
(c) The Secretary is further authorized a..'""l.d
directed by proper deed . . . to convey any
lands or interest in lands acquired in any
78
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State under the prov~s~ons of this statute . .
to the State highway department of such State
or such political subdivision as its laws may
provide . . . .

•

In 1960 the California Highway Commission attempted to
condemn the Eden Park property.

But a state Court, relying on

the statutes referred to above, enjoined this state condemnation
effort.

The State Highway Engineer then "requested" the

federal government to condemn the property on its own pursuant
to § 107.

Under that section, the Secretary of Commerce proceeded

to condemn the land through federal proceedings and to deed it
back to the state.

But state highway officials were then sued

in state court to enjoin them from constructing the freeway
through the cemetery property.
In its opinion

the California Supreme Court first affirmed

the constitutionality of the federal§ 107, concluding that it
"seeks a reasonable balance between local and national needs with
respect to the interstate system,." and that it "does protect local
interests by requiring that the state request any action by the
Secretary pursuant to its terms."
394, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 794.

59 Cal. 2d at 418, 380 P.2d at

But at this point the Court was

required to consider a second challenge:

that given the state's

own cemetery statutes, the State Highway Engineer had no authority
to'~equese'federal

action which would result in

a circumvention of.those statutes.

The Supreme Court seemingly

under state law

agreed that the statutes could be interpreted as forbidding the
Engineer from making this request.

But the Court then concluded

that this implied prohibition was itself overridden by § 820.
That is, since § 820 intended to "abrogate inconsistent state
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laws" for purposes of "planning and constructing federally
assisted state highways," § 820 superseded the state law
prohibition which would otherwise prevent the State Highway
Engineer from requesting federal intervention. 59 Cal. 2d at
419, 380 P.2d at 394-95, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95.
That the state-law provision which § 820 was allowed to
override was no more than "implicit" in character weakens the

'

drama of Eden Park; and I should note again that the Court, in
applying § 820, did not explicitly consider its constitutionality.
Nevertheless, the Eden Park opinion surely suggests the Supreme
Court's sympathy with the California Legislature's conclusion
that the maintenance of state prerogatives (as expressed in
existing state laws and regulations) can properly be subordinated
to the need to comply with federal norms in order to secure
certain benefits available from federal sources.
It is noteworthy, by the way, that § 820 contains a useful
procedural mechanism.
Any major conflicts between the laws, rules,
or reguYations of this state and any such
federal law, rules, and regulations which
have been resolved under this Section during
a calendar year shall be described in a
report which the department shall submit to
the Legislature no later than January 30 of
the succeeding California year.
With this information collected in the annual report, the Legislature
is in a position intelligently to consider how well the § 820 process
of collaboration is working, and to modify or create exceptions in
that section to the extent that the results it produces seem
unsatisfactory.
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5. Another statutory "precedent" on California-to-federal
delegation can be found in the Revenue and Taxation Code.
California's basic inheritance tax is described and imposed in
that Code's §§ 13401-13411.
"additional tax."

Sections 13441-13443 provide for an

According to § 13441:

In the event that a Federal Estate Tax is
payable to the United States in a case
where the inheritance tax payable to this
state is less than the maximum state tax
credit allowed by the Federal State Tax
law, a tax equal to the difference between
the maximum credit and the inheritance tax
payable is hereby imposed.
Section 13442 carries the logic of § 13441 to its logical extreme:
If no inheritance tax is payable to the state
in a case where a federal estate tax is payable
to the United States, a tax equal to the maximum
state tax credit allowed by the Federal Estate
Tax law is hereby imposed.
These

provis~ons,

which date back to 1943, have been explained

as follows (in R. Bock, 1980 Guidebook to California Taxes, at 359):
The -estate tax (sometimes called "pickup tax") is
imposed in order to obtain for the state the
maximum benefit from the federal credit for state
inheritance tax. . . . The state thus collects a
tax which would otherwise go to the federal government,
and the total combined state and federal tax is not
increased, since the additional state tax is offset
by the additional credit against the federal tax.
It is clear from the logic and purpose of these provisions that
the delegation it provides for is of an "ongoing" sort.

Though

the provisions have been part of California law since 1943, they
have never been judicially challenged on grounds that they entail
an impermissible delegation.

Of course, the provisions are in a
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way rendered invulnerable by the nature of their operation:

• do not subject any California estate to even a penny of
they
additional aggregate taxation.

(For that matter, they do not

result in any California estate paying even a penny less in
aggregate taxation.)

Under §§ 13441-43, the basic "winner" is

the state of California, which receives higher tax revenues than
it otherwise would receive; the basic "loser" is the federal
treasury, which can receive somewhat less revenue from an
individual estate than it otherwise would receive.

And federal

lawmaking authorities have made no effort to contest the state
strategy which the California provisions manifest.
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F.

CALIFORNIA LAW ON THE DELEGATION OF LAWMAKING AUTHORITY
FROM ONE JURISDICTION TO ANOTHER:

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF KUGLER

People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 C. 3d 4f?O,
487 P.2d 1

3, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971), dealt with the Tahoe

Regional Planning Agency, to which the California Legislature had
delegated powers to comprehensively regulate land use
Tahoe basin.
the

In considering the constitutionality of the delegation,
Supreme Court simply held that the "standards" in

the enab
the

legislation were sufficient to provide guidance to
in carrying out its land use responsibilities.

present
it

the Lake

es, what is interesting about the Agency is that

a bi-state

compact.

For

ent~ty

authorized by a Congressional interstate

The Agency's board consists of ten members, five chosen

by California officials, but the other five by Nevada officials.
In approving the

Cal~fornia

Legislature's delegation, the Court

did not advert to the fact that a full half of the Agency's
governors were representatives of another jurisdiction.

But

especially insofar as El Dorado can be regarded in·_.the;eemtext. · · ·
of·Kugier v. Yoeum. (see below), implicit in the silence of the
El

opinion is the following three-step logic:

An interstate

endeavor is an appropriate way--if not the only way--for dealing
with the problem at hand; bi-state membership is essential to
such an
solved

tate undertaking; the nature of the problem to be
justifies California's extra-jurisdictional delegation.

A related point focuses on reciprocity.

In return for California's

California lawmaking powers on Nevada officials, the
has agreed to lodge Nevada lawmaking authority
in

This further emphasizes the extent to
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which the mutuality of the problem warrants a mutual solution,
with the whole of the Agency's effective powers being greater
than the sum of its California and Nevada parts.
Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 445 P.2d 303, 71 Cal. Rptr.
687 (1968), contains the most recent discussion by the California
Supreme Court on the specific subject of inter-jurisdictional
delegations.

•

Indeed, given its reasoning, Kugler stands as the

most important case in California law on the general question of
legislative delegations of all sorts.

Kugler dealt with a City

of Alhambra ordinance* which provided that in all future years
Alhambra firemen should be paid salaries comparable to firemen
salaries in the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles.
In understanding the reasoning of the Kugler majority, it is
useful to begin with the position taken by the Kugler dissent.
Justice Burke, joined by Justice McComb, would have found
an invalid delegation, insofar as the ordinance

would strip from Alhambra's city council its
discretion to determine one end of the wage
scale (the minimum), and delegate that discretion
to the governing bodies of two outside public
agencies which are entirely without responsibility
to the City of Alhambra, its employees, voters,
or taxpayers. This seems to me to offend democratic
principles in addition to the basic requirements
of the City's charter.
69 C.2d at 385, 445 P.2d at 312, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
The majority's reasoning can be broken down into several

*I simplify here somewhat. The ordinance was a proposed
initiative which had received the needed number of signatures
but which the City had refused to place on the ballot on grounds
of the alleged illegality of its delegation.
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points.
•

(1) What the anti-delegation doctrine really requires is that

the lawmakers "effectively resolve the truly fundamental issues."
In many cases, such "resolution" will take the form of "standards"
set forth by the legislature to guide decisions rendered by others.
But in other cases,the "fundamental issues" can be resolved even
without any standard setting.
(

What is the fundamental issue?

To a large extent,

this depends on how the legislature chooses to perceive or
the problem at hand.
imp

The Alhambra lawmakers had

ignated as "fundamental" the "issue" of parity

between Alhambra wages and Los Angeles wages.
~be

So long as this

regarded as the fundamental issue, then Alhambra's

lawmakers have indeed decided it, and later events in Los Angeles
City and County which actually determine particular wage levels
can be regarded as mere matters of application.
(3)

Alhambra's designation of parity as the fundamental

issue is quite reasonable.

Alhambra lawmakers may recognize

that they will-be _unable to recruit firemen if their wages are
lower than those in Los Angeles.

Also, Alhambra officials may

appreciate that Los Angeles officials may "possess a superior
abilityn to review firemen wages in other jurisdictions and to
engage

the research needed for an appropriate salary determina-

Delegation doctrine should take into account the "practical
necess

" of governmental processes.

For example, smaller

Alhambra face serious problems in gathering the
appropriate for the formulating of proper
wage s
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(5)

What the delegation doctrine calls for is not "standards"

as• such but rather "safeguards."

And an enlightened delegation

doctrine is primarily concerned with "the degree of protection
against arbitrariness."

nrf an external private or governmental

body is involved in the application of the legislative scheme,
it must be an agency that the legislature can expect will reasonably perform its function."
71 Cal, Rptr. at 694.

69 Cal. 2d at 382, 445 P.2d at 310,

Alhambra lawmakers can reasonably assume

that Los Angeles City and County have no interest in paying
their firemen excessive or unnecessarily high wages.

This

assumption provides the necessary "safeguard" and the assurance
of "reasonable performance."
(6)

The Court's general delegation philosophy is set forth

in an eloquent concluding paragraph.
Doctrinaire legal concepts should not be invoked
to impede the reasonable exercise of legislative
power properly designed to frustrate abuse. Only
in the event of a total abdication of that power
through failure either to render basic policy
decisions or to assure that they are implemented
as made will this Court intrude on legislative
enactment because it is an "unlawful delegation,"
and then only to preserve the representative
character of the process of reaching legislative
decision.
69 Cal, 2d at 384, 445 P.2d at 311, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
While Kugler itself dealt with a local ordinance, its
discussion of the delegation problem operates at a very general
level; it is clear, therefore, that Kugler principles apply to
delegations by the state legislature as well as delegations by
local governments.

For a case so holding, see Martin v. County of

Contra Costa, 8 Cal. App. 3d 856, 87 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1970).
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Martin a state statute provided that employees of the Municipal

•

Court in Contra Costs (for whose salaries the state is responsible)
receive the same remuneration as the County chooses to pay its
own employees in comparable positions.

The Court of Appeal,

applying Kugler, concluded that the statute was plainly constitu. tional.

The Court interpreted the Martin statute as contemplating

regular review of the implementation of the statute by the
Legislature.

8 Cal. App. 3d at 862, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 890.

This

review afforded a "safeguard" in the Kugler sense.
the level of generality of Kugler's discussion of the
delegation
applied~

tion, there should be no question but that Kugler

at least in a general way, to delegations by the state

to federal officials.

This is proven rather conclusively by an

example of a lawful delegation which the Kugler opinion volunteers:
If [a California] statute provides that salaries
are to be adjusted to future changes in the cost
of living, the legislature must designate a body,
such as the United States Department of Labor,
which may be expected to reasonably perform the
function of ascertaining the cost of living.
69- Cal. 2d at 382, 445 P.2d at 310, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
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II.
A.

ANALYSIS

THE EXTENT OF THE DELEGATION
Any choice by the California Legislature to adopt a general

rule of complete open-ended conformity, or to participate in the
Federal-State Tax Collection Act (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6361-65),
would entail a very substantial delegation.

•

First of all, either

choice would involve a decision to conform the state's income tax
to federal income tax norms.

At least four sorts of decisions

ordinarily go into the calculation of taxable income.
The first set of decisions rests on what can be called pure
tax logic.

An example:

if long-term capital gains merit special

tax treatment, this is partly because inflation would otherwise
overstate the taxpayer's true gain, and partly because without
special treatment a gain that has materialized over a considerable
period of time would be unfairly and excessively taxed in one
year only.

_While federal law provides that one year of ownership

of capital gain for special long-term treatment, California lawmakers have concluded that only five years of ownership merits
full long-term tre.atment (Revenue & Taxation Code § 18162. 5).
California's opportunity to render its own decisions on pure tax
matters of this sort would be eliminated if it opted for complete
conformity.*

*I use existing California tax rules to illustrate the
differences between U.S. and California tax perspectives. Using
existing rules as illustrations is, however, an imperfect enterprise. After all, existing California rules could be overridden
by a mere incorporation-by-reference (not just by an open-ended
delegation). Conversely, even in an open-ended conformity regime,
existing California rules could be protected by attaching specific
modifications to the conformity rule. See page 64, infra.
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Tax

stimulate or

es are often designed to

moderate the general economy.

Thus the special treatment of

capital gains may also be intended to encourage the process
of capital formation.

The state perspective on the control of

the general economy may well be different from that of the
federal perspec

(Indeed, the economic

terature emphasizes

that macroeconomic planning is best or at least most frequently
undertaken at the national level.)

If a state does accept

complete conformity, it would be depriving itself of the opportunity of influencing macroeconomic policy by way of any state
income tax rules it might enact or amend.
Many income tax rules amount to so-called "tax

..

expenditures.~~

•

That is, rules on credits, deductions, and the non-taxability of
forms of income may well be intended by the Legislature to serve
as subsidies to various classes of persons and to various

fo~

of activities; these subsidies are often designed to achieve a
certain allocative effect.

Thus the solar energy credit introduced

into California law in 1976 and then revised in 1977 and 1978
(Revenue

& Taxation Code

§§ 17052.5, 17055) is obviously intended

to encourage property owners' investment in solar energy projects.
The charitable contribution deduction in both state (Revenue &
Taxation Code § 17214) and federal law

evidently

igned

at

least in part. to encourage donations to approved charities.
However, California's maximum for charitable contributions (20%
of adjusted gross income) (Revenue & Taxation Code § 17215) is
much less than the federal 50% maximum; California has thus chosen
to place meaningful limits on the extent of its subsidy to
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charitable giving. California's opportunity to make up its
•
own mind on matters of this sort would be eliminated by a
complete conformity poli"cy.
Finally, income tax law is designed to achieve the goal of
equity among taxpayers--"horizontal equity," to use standard tax
parlance.

The renters' credit provided for in California law

(Revenue & Taxation Code § 17053.5) can easily be understood in
equity terms.

Whatever the justifications may be for allowing

income tax deductions for property taxes and interest payments,
the truth remains that these deductions provide homeowners with
enormous tax benefits.

The renters' credit is designed to at

least alleviate the inequality between owners and renters that
the tax rules otherwise engender.

California's opportunity to

render equity judgments of this sort would be expunged were it
to elect full conformity.
To be sure, the state could attach certain "modifications"
even to an open-ended conformity statute; and the federal Act
recognizes state interests in a limited number of areas where it
was obvious to Congress that the state's perspective differs
from the federal perspective.

But limited exceptions of this

sort apart, modifications and open-ended conformity would require
state lawmakers to abandon the enterprise of state income-tax
policymaking .. The "social" as well as the "economic" aspects
of this policymaking were referred to in Wallace in invalidating
Minnesota's conformity statute.
Even if the state does decide to conform or to participate
in the federal program, however, important state prerogatives
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respecting tax policy would be preserved.

Under piggybacking,

whichever of the§ 6362(a)(2) options it elects, the participating state would retain full authority to set the general level
of the state income tax burden.

The extent of this burden is

one of the most important features of income tax policymaking.
Also, by choosing option§ 6362(a)(2)(A) rather than§ 6362(a)(2)(
the state would retain full authority over the state income tax
rate structure.

If the state does retain this power, then it

reserves for itself the authority to determine the progress
of the state income tax--that is, the extent to which the tax
attempts to achieve the so-called goal of "vertical equity. '
And under conformity without piggybacking, the statute obviously
retains full control both over tax burden and over progress
In these respects, however, California presently stands
a rather special situation, given the pendency of Proposi

9.

In the absence of Proposition 9, the above comments on
servation of state authority over tax burden and rate structure
are accurate.

If Proposition 9 passes, however, the California

Constitution would prevent the California Legislature from rais
any tax rate above 50 percent of what that rate is now.

Under

Proposition 9, therefore, the only power the state Legis
would retain over the level of tax burden is the power to
that burden to less than 50 percent of its present level;
Legislature could affect the progressivity of the state income
tax only by reducing particular rates to less than 50 percent
their current levels--not by raising any rates to above that
point.

Proposition 9, by vastly curtailing the discretion
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the state Legislature would otherwise possess under the federal
•

Act, correspondingly enhances the extent to which the adoption
of conformity would work a state-to-federal delegation.
(In another way, however, Proposition 9 diminishes the
delegation.

By reducing tax rates to no more than 50 percent

of their present levels, Proposition 9 would proportionately
reduce the monetary effects of all tax rules on includability
and deductability, decision-making power over which the Act
would exclusively assign to the federal government.

By depriving

these rules of at least half of their practical impact,
Proposition 9 would to some extent mollify the delegation
objection.)
Discussed above is the extent to which a decision in favor
of full conformity would delegate state lawmaking powers.

But

if California chooses not only to conform but also to participate
in the federal program, this latter choice would seemingly enhance
the delegation in a dramatic way.

For under the Act, administra-

tion of the income tax would become exclusively (or almost exclusively) a federal responsibility.

In the first instance, the

basic responsibility for auditing taxpayer returns would rest with
the federal government.

(Note, however, the observation by

Professor Stoltz that, while a "cursory reading of the statute
might result in the . . . conclusion that the law prohibits
supplemental state audit activity," this reading is "mistaken";
"it is clear from the legislative history that Congress did not
intend to prohibit supplemental state auditing efforts.

Thus a

state with a high level of audit activity could continue such
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activity as a supplement to the federal effort." See Stoltz &
•
Purdy, Federal Collection of State Income Taxes, 1977 Duke L.J.
61, 109.

However, even under Stoltz's view of the Act, any state

auditing would be wholly "supplemental" or advisory in nature.)
Under the Act all decisions as to whether to initiate
enforcement proceedings would evidently be rendered by federal
officials.

All tax litigation, either initiated by the govern-

ment or by the taxpayer in seeking a refund, would take place in
federal court rather than in state court.

Section 636l(b).

Federal officials, and those officials alone, would have the
power and responsibility "to represent state interests" in all
administrative and judicial proceedings.

Section 636l(d)(l)(a).

In securing enforcement, only those civil and criminal penalties
provided for by federal law could be resorted to.

Section 636l(a).

Any penalties which state law might profess to provide for taxpayer
violations of the state tax would be regarded as an impermissib
form of "double jeopardy."

Section 6362(f)(6).

The federalization of the administration of the state income
tax which these various provisions would affect suggests that a
state's decision to participate in the federal program would
amount to a colossal delegation of a sort unprecedented (so far
as I know) in Americ.an federal history.

Not only state legislative

power, but state executive and judicial power, would all be
transferred to the federal government.

(Note, however, that the

special constitutional rules on the delegation of state judicial
power all pertain to statutes which remand seemingly judicial
matters to administrative agencies for primary decisionmaking.
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Under the federal Act, matters which are presently decided by
the state judiciary would be submitted instead to the judi
of the federal government.

ary

There is thus no abandonment of the

taxpayer's right to a judicial decision--the right which those
special rules seek to vindicate.

While the delegation of state

judicial powers to the federal government should certainly
"count" in assessing the extent and the implications of the
overall delegation, it does not seem to raise any independent
delegation question.)
The above paragraphs have attempted to evaluate the character
of the delegation which full conformity or piggybacking would
constitute.

But enormous benefits would also result from decis

to conform or to piggyback. * Many of those benefits would accrue
to individual taxpayers.

Under conformity. taxpayers would secure

welcome advantages in terms of the reduced time (or monetary cost)
involved in preparing state income tax returns.

And in addition

to tax preparation savings, the process of tax planning would also
simplified, insofar as this planning would now need to reckon
with only one

se~

of income tax rules.

State government also would reap substantial savings.

A

conformity policy would greatly reduce that administrative burden
on the state bureaucracy which is presently engendered by the
differential between state and federal tax rules.

Moreover, given

the provisions in the federal Act as amended, participation in
Act would enable the state to achieve further savings by way of
*These benefits are well described in the general literature
on conformity, and I describe them only briefly here.
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the elimination of the costly state personal income tax
•

administrative apparatus.
Benefits would also be achieved by way of conserving the
resources of the state

Legislat~re

itself.

Since the Legis

has in the past recognized the obvious advantages of conformity,
substantial amounts of legislative effort have been expended in
reviewing changes in federal income tax law and in determining
which of those changes the state, in the name of conformity, should
choose to adopt'.

Adoption of an open-ended conformity rule would

liberate the state Legislature from this burden on its energies.
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B.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DELEGATION
In circumstances of this sort, where a delegation achieves

enormous benefits but also deprives the state of important
ity, how should the California analyst think about the cons

tu-

tional question?
My basic

ass~tion

here is that Kugler v. Yokum is the

relevant judicial authority.

While Kugler immediately deals with

a municipal ordinance, the Kugler discussion of delegation is
deliberately couched at a level of generality which makes it
seemingly relevant to delegations of every sort.

That Kugler

principles apply to delegations by the state is thus obvious
enough from the Kugler opinion itself, and has since been verified
by Martin.

Those Kugler principles are explicitly concerned with

the problem of inter-jurisdictional delegations; and an examp
which the Kugler opinion explicitly advances (a state statute
giving effect to future changes in the cost of living as determined
by the federal Department of Labor) makes it sufficiently clear
that Kugler can be applied to delegations from the state to the
federal government.

To this extent Kugler takes precedence over

language in Burke and Brock--language which was, after all, no more
than dictum (if that), and which was challenged from an early
by the strong Court of Appeal holding in Lasswell. In any event,
the Rule that state delegations to the federal government are per
se invalid seems to be exactly the kind of "doctrinaire" delegation
concept which the Kugler opinion inveighs against.
Assuming that Kugler applies, what results does it suggest?
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Here there are two alternatives to consider:

an open-ended

conformity statute; and participation in the federal program.
Here the important initial point is that each of these alternatives seems to comply with the Kugler criteria for a valid delegation.

Kugler allows the legislative body to determine what

the "fundamental issue" is and then endorses whatever delegations
result from the legislature's resolution of that issue.

In

reviewing both the general advantages of conformity and the additional advantages of piggybacking, the California Legislature
c.ould reasonably conclude that the "fundamental issue" for personal income tax purposes is whether the state should approve of
conformity and accept the federal invitation--whether the multiple advantages of conformity justify the reduction in state
authority.

In Kugler itself, the Court agreed that Alhambra could

characterize the "fundamental issue" in terms of whether the
advantages of compensation parity outweighed the corresponding
loss of city discretion.

Especially if the Legislature's vote

rests on the basis of an adequate deliberation (a good legislative
record would be helpful in this regard), the Legislature will have
rendered decision on the fundamental issue and to that extent
discharged its Kugler obligations.
Kugler does suggest that a legislature's resolution of the
fundamental issue must meet minimum standards of reasonableness
or responsibility.

But certainly the advantages of conformity

and also of piggybacking are substantial enough to confirm the
plausibility of a legislative decision which seeks to obtain them.
Kugler requires that if an "external governmental body" is implicated
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a legislative scheme, the legislature must be able to expect
that this body "will reasonably perform its fw"'"lction."

Certainly

the Legislature could possess this expectation vis-a-vis the
federal government.

If Alhambra can reasonably assume that Los

Angeles City and County will not pay their firemen excessively,
so California can reasonably assume that federal authorities
have no incentive either to develop oppressive income or deduction
rules or to foolishly fritter away the income tax base. *

If

Alhambra can recognize the greater information-gathering resources
of Los Angeles City and County, so the California Legislature could
reasonably place confidence in the general income-tax sophistication
of Congress and the Internal Revenue Service.
As noted in Part I-D, there are a number of judicial decisions
upholding open-ended state tax conformity statutes.

These decis

validated conformity because of the benefits they perceived conformity as achieving:

"convenience to the taxpayer" and "economy to

the state" (or "simplicity of administration").

The recognition

of these benefits in this cluster of cases provides support for
the Kugler idea that· the Legislature, if it votes in favor of
open-ended conformity, will have rendered a responsible judgment
on the fundamental issue.

(The only complication is found in

Mullaney's suggestion that "labor saving" on the part of the
Legislature should not count as a legitimate benefit.

On this

complication, see the discussion of Sharpnack below.)

As for the

*Compare Cheney, p. 22, in which a state legislature sought
to utilize--for income tax purposes--a formula worked out by the
I.C.C. for quite different rate regulation purposes.
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elimination of state administrative costs which would result if
the state were to agree to piggybacking, implicit in Streets and
Highways Code § 820 and in the Supreme Court's Eden Park opinion is
the idea that it may well be sensible for the state to forsake some
of its prerogatives in order to secure the benefits available from
federal programs.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Sharpnack
reinforces the Kugler argument in favor of open-ended conformity.
Sharpnack holds, in line with Kugler, that the advantages of conformity or parity can justify an open-ended inter-jurisdictional
delegation.

In Sharpnack there had been a longstanding Congres-

sional policy of conforming federal enclave law with the law of
the state in which the enclave was located.

Given all its experi-

ence with incorporation-by-reference measures, Congress could
(according to the Court) reasonably take the small additional leap
involved in approving an ongoing delegation.

In like manner, the

California Legislature has long displayed a strong interest in
conforming the state's income tax laws with those of the federal
government.

Russell Bock's 1980 Guidebook to California Taxes is

helpful in revealing the extent of that interest.

The text of

that Guidebook reveals that most existing California personal
income tax rules do indeed conform (or at least adequately "compare")
to federal tax rules.

And Bock's _summary of 1979 California income

tax legislation (at pages 7-9) verifies that the clear majority
of all the income tax measures which the Legislature enacted in a
seemingly typical year were motivated by the Legislature's general
concern for conformity.
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The

contains one complication,

Congressional experience described in Sharpnack revealed an
undeviating practice of past conformity.

But with respect to

ome tax law, the California Legislature, while it has usual
sen to conform to the federal model, in any number of significant particulars has declined to conform (either by failing to
act or by acting in a nonconforming way).

•

As for this comp

ca-

tion, however, the state Legislature is clearly entitled to
reflect, in a retrospective and comprehensive way, upon the
lessons of its experience.

And as it considers the state's

income tax in its existing whole--as it reviews the pattern of
state-federal deviations which its individual decisions (or
indecisions) have produced--the Legislature could plausibly cone
that the process of state lawmaking has not been successful
producing benefits commensurate with that process's taxpayer
titutional costs.
I

If the Legislature's resulting decis

to

conserve on its own labor (by way of open-ended conformity) rests
on a reasonable finding that its labor has not been produc
expended in the past, then the goal of "labor saving"--that is,
of deploying the Legislature's scarce resources to their maximum
public advantage--seems commendable rather than illicit in
character.
For all of these reasons, however. a Kugler analys
reinforced by Sharpnack, seemingly supports the legali
open-ended delegation, and even of piggybacking.

of an

There are,

however, two objections to consider.
The first concerns the possibility of state legislative
oversight.
a

Oversight is certainly one form of "safeguard"

legation; and Kugler makes clear that safeguards are ess
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to constitutionality. Under "mere" ongoing conformity, the
•
Legislature could (and undoubtedly should) set up a formal
mechanism to apprise itself of any significant changes in federal
income tax law and to develop a policy analysis of each of those
changes.

With the help of the information and analyses which this

mechanism would contribute, the Legislature would be in a good
position to consider whether any modifications of its conformity
policy are warranted.

(See the discussion above of the report-

making "safeguard" in Streets & Highways Code § 820 and of the
statute in Martin.)

But the situation is very different if

California chooses to participate in the federal piggybacking program.

As a matter of formal law, a decision by a state like

California to participate woulrl be reversible, so long as the
state makes up its mind within the deadline which the federal
Act stipulates.

Practically speaking, however, such a decision

to participate may well be irreversible.

Once a state, in joining

the federal program, dismantles its personal income tax bureaucracy.
it would be extremely difficult for the state legislature to withdraw from the
of heart.

~rogram

if the legislature should undergo any change

Thus a state's acceptance of the federal piggybacking

invitation may well be effectively permanent in character.

Kugler

requires courts to consider the "practical necessities" of
governmental processes.

Here, a "practical" evaluation suggests

that the state Legislature may have little ability to act should
it later determine that a particular new federal tax rule is
obnoxious to state policy or that its original decision to
participate in the federal program seems no longer supportable.
From a delegation perspective, all of this is disturbing.
1

n1
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The second objection concerns the "scope" or extens
the delegation in question.
delegation law?

- - -ter
-

Th~s

s

Is "scope" relevant at all

is uncertain.

The extreme breadth of the

statute seemingly influenced the Schecter Court

ruling of unconstitutionality.

its

Yet. faced with a statute of

moderate breadth in Sharpnack. the Supreme Court simply ignored
the concern for scope expressed in Justice Douglas's dissenting
opinion.
I

Kugler is the fountainhead of contemporary California

law, and Kugler, in stating delegation standards, pays no heed
to scope.

But the actual ordinance which was before the Kugler

Court--dealing only with firemen compensation--was obviously
rather narrow in scope.

Perhaps it is best to assume that if

the scope of a delegation is sufficiently extreme, then scope has
at least some bearing on the constitutional question.
The scope of the delegation under an open-ended conformity
statute is doubtless broad.

Yet it does not seem at all extreme

when compared to the federal NRA, ruled on in Schecter.

Note.

however, that a piggybacking delegation contains additional
distinctive elements of breadth.

Piggybacking, like conformity,

would transfer· tax-law policymaking to the federal government; but
piggybacking,

~like

conformity, would also transfer near-comp

te

authority over the administration of the state's income tax.
(''Administration" in this context includes prosecutorial
judicial authority, and the authority to establish a s
sanctions and penalties.)
Even as for the transfer of tax-law policymaking, there is an
additional important point to make--which is that under ongoing
102
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conformity (but not under piggybacking) there would be a meaningful
•
if limited opportunity for state control on the absoluteness of
that transfer.

As the record in other jurisdictions shows, a

state like California could easily combine a general rule of ongoing
conformity with at least a limited number of "modifications" which
could be capable of taking strong interests into account.

Modifi-

cations of this sort could, for example, enable California to adhere
to its past policy on the solar energy credit, on the renter's
credit, and on the low ceiling on charitable contributions. *

Of

course, the power to modify would also provide a legislative outlet
for the ongoing policy reviews of new federal tax rules, as described
at page 63.

The modification feature of an open-ended conformity

statute thus enables the state to qualify its delegation of policymaking power in a way that confirms the assessment that this de
is something less than extreme.

A state would possess no similar

modifying ability, however, should it undertake to piggyback.
The assessment of the two objections thus leads to the
following conclusions.

There is very good reason to believe that

an open-ended conformity statute would be held constitutional £y
the California Supreme Court.

Open-ended conformity fully complies

with the Kugler criteria, and the delegation, while much wider in
scope than the delegations ruled on and described in Kugler, could
be effectively safeguarded by a formalized process of legislative
review, and kept under control by a legislative willingness to

*It would be not easy--though perhaps not impossible--to handle
California 1 s differential treatment of capital gains by way of a
conformity modification.
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consider at least a limited number of modifications.
decision could also be supported by Kugler.

A piggyb

But here the "scope"

of the delegation seems more extreme, insofar as it both excludes
the state's power to "modify" and remits full judicial, administrative, and sanction-setting authority to the federal government.
Also, a Kugler consideration of the "practical necessities" of
governmental operations suggests the probable absence of the

•
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"safeguard" of effective legislative review of the continuing
correctness of the original legislative decision.

In these

circumstances, the only prediction that can claim to be candid
is one that recognizes that the Supreme Court could easily rule
either way on piggybacking--either extending Kugler to affirm the
state's participation in the federal program, or interpreting
Kugler narrowly and thereby invalidating that participation.
(An added uncertainty concerns the character of the "scrutinyiY

which the Supreme Court would give to any California decision to
piggyback.

For purposes of applying Kugler, should piggybacking

be compared to the present California situation, or should it be
compared instead to the intermediate possibility of open-ended
conformity without piggybacking.

The calculation of the benefits

of piggybacking--as well as the calculation of the delegation
detriments--importantly depends on what the basis for comparison
is.

Yet I find little in Kugler that offers guidance as to how

this undertainty should be resolved.

Of course, since no state

has yet chosen to participate in the federal program, there has
been no opportUnity to secure any judicial views on delegation
doctrine in this vexing application.

By contrast, as Part I-D

has shown, we do have case law on open-ended conformity statutes.
While the courts' opinions have hardly been uniform, neither have
they been unsympathetic to the conformity cause.

Several have ruled

in favor of the constitutionality of ongoing conformity; and the
only contrary holding may have rested on that state's peculiarly
restrictive constitutional language.)

lOS
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C.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
One of my conclusions, reported above, is that it is very

likely that the California Supreme Court would find constitutional
an open-ended tax conformity rule adopted by the state Legislature.
In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful of a contrary prediction
expressed in an Opinion of the Office of Legislative Counsel, dated
October 19, 1959.
If I am right in recognizing the 1968 Kugler as the outstanding California authority on the delegation question, then it
follows that the

Legis~ative

Counsel's 1959 Opinion has simply been

superseded by later judicial developments.

It also may be proper

to mention that the Legislative Counsel's Opinion seems rather
selective in its methodology.

In discussing California law, for

example, that Opinion refers to the Supreme Court's language in
Brock, Burke, and Palermo; but it does not mention the strong
Court of Appeal holding in Lasswell.

As for out-of-state law,

it refers to early opinions like Santee Mills and Featherstone,
which had indicated doubts on the delegation question; but it does
not mention an early case like Underwood Typewriter, which had
sustained an open-ended conformity statute.

The Opinion disparages

the Ninth Circuit's sympathetic discussion of delegation in
Mullaney on grounds that the discussion was mere dictum.

Yet in

referring to the California Supreme Court's more negative language
in Brock, Burke, and Palermo, the Opinion fails to indicate
quite limited role which that language played in those three
Court opinions.

Moreover, the Opinion does not even mention the

U.S. Supreme Court's Sharpnack decision, even though that decision
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had been rendered within the previous year, and even though

•
Palermo
had itself recognized the relevance, as analogy, of the
federal Assimilative Crimes Act.
My second conclusion is that piggybacking raises a state
constitutional issue that is effectively too close to call.

By

suggesting at least the possibility of unconstitutionality, this
conclusion warrants a bit of amplification.

Assume Congress

passes a statute imposing a supplement to the existing federal
income tax and providing that the proceeds of this supplementary
tax be distributed (in a revenue-sharing manner) back to the
states according to a formula that gives priority to the state
of taxpayer origin.

Since both the taxing and spending features

of this federal statute entail fully federal activities requiring
no collaboration by the state, nothing in a state's constitution
has any bearing on the program's legality.

Assume now that Congress

adds to that program the rule that a state becomes entitled to its
)

share of the federal-tax supplement only if the state agrees to
impose no income tax of its own--only if the state repeals, for
example, any existing state laws providing for such a tax.

Possibly.

this Congressional scheme would "coerce" the states in a manner that
is impermissible under the federal Constitution.

Compare Steward

· Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), with National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). and Brown v. EPA, 431 U.S.
99 (1977).

Yet since the tax in question would remain a genuinely

federal tax, and since the only action which the state legislature
would need to take would be to repeal its own existing tax statute
(in order to secure certain external advantages), I cannot see how
10 7
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the federal program, even as so revised, creates any problems
under the state's constitution.
The program contemplated by the Federal-State Income Tax
Collection Act possesses important elements of similarity with
the programs hypothesized above.

Nevertheless, under that Act

the tax in question is emphatically a state tax.

It is conceived

of as a state tax by the entire text of the Act itself; the

•

state retains the authority to determine the tax's overall burden
and perhaps even the tax rate structure; and of course the Act
gives the states full choice as to whether to participate in the
program in the first place.

The state thus possesses much more

----

authority under the Act than it would possess under the revised
hypothetical program; and exactly because of the extent of that
authority, a state constitutional question arises as to the extent
to which the state has relieved itself of other authority.

There

is irony in this of course--but it is irony of the sort that
recurs in constitutional reasoning, especially in this complex era
of Cooperative Federalism.
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we will be able to
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PERSONAL INCOME TAXES. Legislative Constitutional Amend-·
ment. Legislature may provide for reporting and collecting
California personal income taxes by reference to provisions of
present or future laws of the United States and may prescribe
exceptions and modifications thereto. Prohibits
in state
personal income tax rates based on future changes
federal
rates.

YES

4

(This E.mendment proposed
Senate Constitutional An1endment No. 18,
Regular
Sfssicm, does not expressly amend any existing section of the Constitution, but adds a
new section thereto; therefore, the provisions
thereof are printed in BLACK-FACED
TYPE to indicate they are NEW.)
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
ARTICLE XIII
in subBee. 11~. (a) Except 1!.!1
division (c), the Legislature may simplify
the reporting and collecting of California
personal income taxes, notwithstanding any
other provision of this Conlltitution, by ref-

General Analyais by the
Legiala.tive Counsel
A "Yes" vote on this meMure is a vote to
authorize the Legislature to adopt, by reference, future amendments to federal l&Wll for
the purpose of reporting and collectinr Cali- I
lornia personal income taxeli.
A "No" vote is a vote to deny the Legisla-:
ture this authority. ·
For further details see below.
r

'

Deta.lled Analysis by the
Legisla.tive Counsel
·· Tbe State Constitution hu been eon&trued
u preventing the Legislature, in adoptinr,
federal laws for state purpose~~, from adopt-·
lng future amendments to federal laWL
i
Tbia measure, if approved by the voters,,
would add Section lli to Artiele XTII of the;
Constitution to permit the Legislature-to in- i
corporate provisions of the federal law as
t:hey may be enacted or amended in the fu.
tur.e, u well as to incorporate existinc provilliou of federal law, so as to make t~.
provisions apply to the reporting and eolleetion of atate income taxes. The federal law,:
1110 incorporated, would be made subj~t to
exceptions or modifications, if any, that die
Le-gislature might prescribe.
Tke measure would specifically prohibit
ineorporation by reference into the state law
of the amount of any federal tax on, in respect to, or measured by; personal income
which is computed under provision of tile
federal laws.
Tbe mei!.I!Ure would, in addition, prohibit
the enactment by the Legislature of any
lltatute providing, either directly or indinetly, few a eh!l.llp in the rates of the ~~tate
pttaoWal income tax based on future eha.np
in federal peraon&l income tax rata.
0

NO

erence to !l.llY provision of
laws of the
United States as the same
be or become
effective s.t any time or from time to time,
and may
or modifica.tionll.
provision of the laws
of
shall not refer to the
amount of any federal tax on, in respect to,
or merumred by, personal income which ill
under !l.llY provision of the federa.l
laws.
(c) The Legisla.ture shall not enact !l.lly
llta.tnte which directly or indirectly
for a. change in state personl!J. income tax
rates based upon future changes in personal
incoma tax rates of the United Sta.W.

Argument in Favor of Proposition lfo.'
At l!l.!lt Here is a proposal to make our
atate income tax easier to figure out.
A YES vote on this proposition will allow
the Legislature to conform state income tax
laws as much as practical to federal income
tax laws. This would me!l.ll we could use the
~alcul.ation~ made for federal tax purposes
In filling out our state tax form. There ia no
reMon why the burden of taxation should
be made even
Califm:-Dia taxpl!lyem
the tim.-IUUllllnc proee~~~~~
hs.vinr
,nil
eompute a complicated state
differe.nt fro• tJae federal fol'IIL We
Bot 88Cept the
federal tax ~. Ja
0

feden.l
of eompubng Income
eeptable
'WI &nd should be mc:orno.ra!,ea
our state law. At
time in the
Legislature may
that a
new federal law would ,.,,,.,.,."~'"'
state financial structure and we could
that change. Thus, our own State
will retain the
to write our
ao they will
fit the economy of California's taxpayers.
The California
conducted a
two-year study of our
11trueture
proposal is one of the recommendations that
Wl!.!l made. A number of states have already
adopted this system, and most of our profe~~
sional
and accounting societies are 1rnp-

&~·~~~~~~~~~
present law we. make additillllllil,
!l.lld computations necessary fer
t:he federal tax form and then go through ,u
e.ntirely d.il!'erent process for the state tliiJt
ret11rll. For those who hire aecount!l.lltlil to
prepare their form~~, this
There are now many differe1ac•~ bebr~~~GI!Il
the federal law and the &tate law. Thia
ponl will el!.!le administration !l.lld
u returns will be eMier to
!l.lld
Thia will simplify the atate return
min on the sise of the form. - .
The,vast
of the section~~ of Ole
federal income
and the state
tax law are similar now-but the few
ferences that do exist are the ".,.'""""'
we seek to simplify with this co:nstihttic)IU!l
amendment.
We are
away our own power
to make neceiiiiiUJ" changes in our tax 1&1n1
in the futun. we simply sar th!"i the present
subtraction~~,

111

SENATOR JAMES R. »u.-'-LU..,
San Diego
ASSEMBLYMAN JAMES A. BAYJI:S,
Long Beach

f.
California votem &hould vote NO on Propreason~~:
osition 4 for the

meuure vropoaE!S,
iaW'll to
other federal laws.
Californians would
the responsibility

I

11erve '""·'"'"rn
for increases in
not be
~md W asbington. The
the tllx dollar
.,,,...,..,,.,.,..,1.,. to the electorat.
for levying
tax. This is the best ~USU:r!moe
tbat your elected
will caNfully balance the
of taxpayen awl
the beneflciariea of 11tate appropriation~~.
A NO vote on P:rop011ition 4 will proteet
the
wages of the lower ineoli!MI
~md
in California.

A NO

on Propooition 4
tax laws
made by California h~2:islat<ll"'l,
n!t~nl!!entltti,~ea from
l!tatea..
bow
proposal will do
U<.rnav,Pr. Ita imintoomr
HUCH>Ulillll to VOte

all Californians that

RICHARD J. DOLWIG

California State Senator
12th Senate District
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THE WALL STREE":' JOURNAL, Thurlday,

Au~st 13, 1981
I

Reagan's Tax Cuts Leave States in a Bind
Because ofLinks. With Federal Formuf®
A WALL SThh:ltT JoUJtNAL

•

I

NrwsRounthip

}

Passage of President Reagan's tax-cut
program has to~ additional burdens oo
stat!' gowrnments that alrrady are scram-1
hlmg :o deal with reducuons in federal ald.
lkrause most states have linked at least
part of th~>lr tax formulas to tht> federal gov·j
•·rnnwnt's, th(' swt•Ppln~r tax cuts enacted, by .
1
<:.m;:n·:..<; have lt>ft tht> state ¥tJVernm~nts 1
!ac-111~ n•v('nue 10!1/.ies estlmlltl'd at as much
as s:u 1J11!10n In the first year after the fed· II
eral act takes effect.
·
"'There's no question that the federal gov· 1
ernment has put us in a bind," said Lt. Gov.
James Green of North Carolina.

I

N"w federal depreciation schedules and
inct•n!ives for savers are expected to cause
the bi~:"gest drains on state revenue. To a
lesser extent. immediate cuts in personal in·
com!' taxes. and the indexing to take effect
In 1!1!!.'>. also are expected to dlmln!Bh state
fund:>. Alrrady, some states have proposed
laws sevrring the links between state and
!edl'ral tax formulas.
The cuts in corporate Income taxes that
will follow the raster depreciation wrtte-offs
in the federal bill wtll cost the states lUI
mated S2 billion In the first year, according
to the National GQvernors Association.
·
or the 4!i states wtth eorporate Income
taxes. 35 use federal Q6t'bt1Uofts of taxable
income, while 26 autoln&UcaUy adopt fed· ,
eral depreciation schedula.
Losses for the StaUIS ,

tso· '

One liberal tax-research group, Citizens
for Tax Justice, has estimated that 2$
states. Including populous New York,~
Jersey, Ohio. Pennsylvania and Ill
·
stand to lose more than $15 billion over the I
next six years because of the faster depreciation rates.
Uls3es to lndlvlduaJ states have been es·
tlmated at as much as $45 million to $60 mil·
lion In the first year for Ma.uach~ $15 ·
million for Kentucky, $33 million
~or·
ida, $12 million for North carolina. m·mll• I
lion for Minnesota, $30 m!Dkm to $311·~
for Georgia, $7 million for~ IIJid $70
million to SIOO million for Pennsylvama. ·

"States must move qUickly to amend
their laws where necesh..ry and mnst be
steadfast against corporate ~ for
conformity if they are to avokl evq more
severe cutback~ In state se~es or In·
creased state and local taxea on worldnr
prople." the tax group ~d.
Based on an earlier version of Uie fe<Mra.l
true bill, Ohio's Department of Taxation several months ago estimated the state would
lose Slll million In tax revenue In fiscal 191!2
and sso million In fiscal 1983. Those loss estimates were based on Ohio adopting the fed·
era! changes In depreciation schedules as
well as the change In the tax on married
couples when both Sj)OI.IlleS work, says Rich·
ard A. Levin, director of research for the

Rift 1n Ohlo

Richard A. Levin. director
rt"'!t'aN
for the Ohlo Department of Taxation. sa
Indexing, which adjusts per:>onallncome t£
rates to offset Inflation. won't affect
state, because Ohio's Income tax Is~ c
federal adjusted gross Income. Indem
changes the amount of tax on Income. tli
. the amount of Income Itself, Mr. Levin said
One change that will decrease the state
tax bite, Mr. Levin said, Is the redue>td t!l
a married couple will pay when 004
BpOIIses are employed.
Under that law. a couple will be
to deduct 5'ro of the Income of the
.nth the lower Income Ul 1981 and
~ lowed to deduct i0'7o of that Income Ill
~Mr. Ltlvin Wd Obio ~imli.tes It
113 million In Its &cal ~ear
: 1983, IUid S'l1 mill\on In #lscal
i Che lAw.
·
, ,
1
But Hi states actml.lly will piA
U:
w cuts beuuse they .allow d~
fedlera.l tax peyments. :ne
·dedu
UoG at federal taxes will leave l"ee!~l
, wi(h more Income for the states to tax.
The three states that "pig~." c
base their taxes on taxpayer's federal lb.bt
ttles. may abandon that ~m. ldjm
tht> "pigiO'back" ratt> w allow for ~ rec
tral cut.a, or cut spend!nr. Nebruka Ta
CornmlalOI'H.'r Fnod Hen111Br.on A)'!& that "
we dldft't do uythlnr. we'd I'Uil out t
mOII{'y," but the state probll.bly won't abar
don piggybacking. ··It saves too muc.
money and It's too convenient." he &ald.

The chuge In the federal depreciaUon
schedule has created a rift In the 0100 lePIIatu~. with the state house pushing for contmuance of the old federiO standards for
state tax purposes and the senate arguiJl.g
that the state "should be moving iD the
same direction as Congress," Mr. Levin
said.
But somP other states, notably California.
wnn't bt· afh'<'tP<I si'-'ltlflcanUy by thl' new
ft-d•·ral rl•·pN'<'IUUon n1l('s. California hu Ill!
own biJ::Oiness lax C!)(lt', whl<"h Isn't link~ to,
the fl'de~~~ .ronnula.. "We. dlcbl't make that
mhitalu·. <.ov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. said.
~
West Virginia, wh 1ch depends primarily
on business and occupation taxes for revenue rather than the corporate income tax,
will see an "almost insignlficam" reduction
in its revenue, said Herschel Rose, tax cammissioner.

m

l

frcm

1111•

One major tax break for savers also
could make deep Inroads In atate ~ri.
The tux-exempt "All-Savers" certlncates
could drive up Interest rates on competlllf •
state and municipal notes and bonda.
I
Individuals are acquiring about half the
dollar value of new municipal bonds and
notes, according to John E. Petersen, dlrector of the Government Ftnuce Research
Center, the research arm of the Munldpall
Finance Officers Association. The threatened
loss of half, or $10 billion, of that private
market would push up tax-exempt nr.tes ooe
percentage point, and that could coat the
state and local governments about $620 mil·
lion a year In extra Interest cosu, be est!·
mated. The National GQvemon Asllodatlon
estimated that cost at S300 million tor tBe

Few Expect Tu

states.

"There aren't a whole Jot of taxable
transactions when somebody puts money an
the bank," sald Ken Cory, California state
treasurer. Tbe state borrows RVeral
hundred milUon dollars a year. he said, but
"we're more worried about reneml Interest
rates than the All-Savers plu."
Ohio's budget director, William D. Kelp,
Bald the All-Savers certll'lcates wtll ha:ve lit·
tie effect In states like Ohio, which he said 1
sells most of Its bonds to Insurance compa·
!lies and other Institutions.
In New Y~k. Michael!· De!Giudice, 1

flllll!l¥. Kucfl Cat-ey'• ~ of. ~ man·

1

~nt.

said New York's bon'c1wiftl' plans
will be affected ":somewhat" by the compeUtion from All·Savers certificates, but he
said the state hasn't decided what ch~~qe
wm be made.
He estimated that the entire paclta,e of
! flederal cuts in the tax bill would cost New
i York $30 million In the current fiscal year,
ending next March :n. $100 million in t!scal
; 1983, and "upwards of $200 mUIIon" each
; year after that.
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•

L'lcrease~

wtllle some state 9fficlals are
leg1slati0n to 110tten file effect! of
tax cut~; few say they wllJ Increase taxes.
"TJI!i governor j'u.lit won't raise taxes,'
New York's ~r. OeiGiildlce saki. "We'l
make up for the losses In spendlng cuts."
And wnile many state oHlclals are dis
I mayed at findmg their own budgets carriec
along on the tide of Mr. Reagan's tax cuts
m<my seem optimistic that if the new fed
eral tax policies succeed in
Uu
economy. the ~tate~ wlll txmem.
..In California, we have 11 lot of ~.~t:!~;r~&o
rqntracton~ and we ~d do
l.llc~ military
1001"(1
~Y into the ~ economy, Mr. Col")

I

said.

.

.

":We ob~ .can ablorb ~ reduc·
tkiM tf we bw ~e ill !.hit econ·
omy," said Pennsylvania's P.obert C. WI!·
bw'tl, Secretary of Budget and Admlmstra·
Uoft. "That's the bli question."
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